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Abstract:  
Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil 
violence, but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM might 
influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e. groups composed of the ruling 
elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state military capacity. The 
greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups also mitigates principal-agent problems but further polarises 
ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs are likely to be associated with longer and 
more intense civil conflict. We test this argument on a global sample of cases from 1989-2007, 
using new data capturing the ethnic ties of all pro-government militia. The results support our 
claims that co-ethnic militia are associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.  
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How do pro-government militia (PGM) influence the dynamics of violence during civil 
conflict? We develop existing theoretical accounts of how and why PGMs shape violent 
conflict by incorporating co-ethnic PGM —an armed force that is clearly pro-government, not 
identified as a part of the regular security force, and recruited specifically from the ruling elite’s 
ethnic kin to undertake tasks in support of their ethnic group (or a coalition of groups). PGMs 
have recently been shown to influence a range of conflict conditions, including: regime 
survival; coups d’etat; human rights violations; one-sided violence; civil-war intensity; and 
insurgent fragmentation (e.g., Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2016; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and 
Schubiger, 2015; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Roessler, 2011; Pilster and Böhmelt, 
2011). Yet to date, research overlooks how the ethno-centric recruitment of many PGMs might 
influence their effect.  
We argue that the strength of ties between the state and PGMs shape their influence on 
civil violence. Civilians are more likely to join a militia and engage in violence when they are 
strongly bound to the state and have a common interest in the military outcome. Moreover, 
according to a principal-agent logic, PGMs (i.e. agents) that operate outside of the state’s (i.e. 
principal’s) control are often likely to engage in actions to improve their position. This is 
particularly the case when the PGM operates in a high-risk context in which compliance with 
the state’s orders carries significant dangers for the agent. Whilst previous research often 
highlights the principal-agent problem facing states that use a PGM, far less work has discussed 
the strategies states use to mitigate this problem, particularly within the context of ethnic 
politics, and the implications that this might have on civil violence. We argue that co-ethnic 
recruitment is one method often used by the state to strengthen ties to the PGM, and reduce 
commitment concerns resulting from the principal-agent problem.  
Broadly speaking, ethnically motivated recruitment can lead to two forms of ethnic 
militia: co-ethnic PGM and defector PGMs. Co-ethnic PGM are those composed of the ruling 
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elite’s ethnic kin (e.g. Hutu Interhamwe in Rwanda and the Shiite militias in Iraq). Defector 
PGMs also fight on behalf of the state, but are composed from the anti-government population, 
often ethnic groups that are excluded from power (e.g. Kurdish Village Guard in Turkey, or 
Home Guard in Kenya), and/or former members of an ethnic insurgent group (e.g. former 
Tamil rebel groups that joined forces with the Sinhalese dominated Sri Lankan government). 
Co-ethnic PGMs have strong ties to the ruling elite, and offer a recruitment advantage 
during armed conflict that makes them highly effective force multipliers. We therefore expect 
co-ethnic PGMs to be associated with greater levels of violence during civil conflict. Despite 
the challenges associated with high intensity violence, the loyalty of co-ethnic PGMs means 
that they suffer less from principal-agent problems. Yet the ethnicized environment they create 
and their willingness to continue fighting increases polarisation between communities. We 
expect the observable implication to be that co-ethnic PGM are more likely to be associated 
with intense and longer periods of civil conflict, which is not necessarily the case for other less 
connected and loyal forms of PGM. We test these arguments on a global sample of cases from 
1981-2007, using new data capturing the ethnic ties of PGMs. The results support our claims. 
 
Pro-Government Militias  
PGMs are organized armed groups aligned with the incumbent government, but not part of the 
“official” state armed forces (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013: 250). PGMs include a 
heterogeneous collection of non-state actors that differ in their recruitment base, composition, 
activities, and targets. For example, death squads, warlords, and civilian defence forces differ 
in terms of  their link with the state (e.g. semi-official or informal), theatre of operations (e.g. 
local or national), and whether they operate within or outside of armed conflict (see, Carey and 
Mitchell, 2017; Böhmelt and Clayton 2017).  
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Previous research demonstrates that PGMs are likely to emerge in weak states facing 
acute security threats, including, but not limited to, insurgency and civil war (Böhmelt and 
Clayton 2017; Carey and Mitchell, 2017; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015). Under such 
conditions, PGMs can emerge from civil society as local security providers in response to 
insurgent violence (Barter 2013; Aliyev 2016). Governments also often mobilize or co-opt 
PGMs as force multipliers in pursuit of short-term advantages; they are cost-effective in 
comparison to conventional forces and are more quickly recruited (Staniland 2012; Jentzsch et 
al, 2015; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2016). Some types of PGMs also enable the government 
to evade accountability for human rights abuses (Kirschke, 2000; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 
2015; Stanton, 2015). Other forms of PGMs, such as civilian defence forces, can provide local 
knowledge that enables the government to better identify insurgents (Clayton and Thomson 
2016; Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2010; Staniland, 2012). This is particularly effective when the 
state incorporates former members of the insurgency into a militia (Kalyvas, 2006; Staniland, 
2012). Finally, parallel-military PGMs can counterbalance conventional forces and mitigate 
internal threats, such as coups (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2016). 
However, recent research has shown that these short-term advantages can have negative 
consequences, arguing that the presence of PGMs can (generally) exacerbate and prolong 
conflict, either because states are unable to control militias or they are unwilling to do so. Using 
a principal-agent framework some have argued that the nature and strength of the state-PGM 
relationship helps to determine levels of violence against civilians, showing that the presence 
of informal PGMs, those with only informal links to the state, compared to those with a semi-
official status, can increase human rights violations (Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014; also see 
Stanton 2015; Kirschke 2000). Once a state has conceded their monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force to PGMs, the state can subsequently struggle to control PGM violence.  According 
to a slightly different logic, since states often use PGMs to plausibly deny responsibility and 
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evade accountability for violent actions taken on their behalf, the use of PGMs with informal 
links to the state (i.e. weaker connections) signals a higher tendency towards intense violence 
and civilian victimization (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2015; Koren 2017). Others see the 
presence of multiple armed organizations (state institutions as well as paramilitary forces and 
PGMs) as associated with more intense violent conflict (Böhmelt and Clayton 2017; Raleigh 
2016). 
In addition to more violent conflict, the evidence also suggests that the use of PGMs 
can increase the duration of a dispute (Aliyev 2017, 2018; Carey, Mitchell and Scharpf, 2018). 
For example, Aliyev (2017) finds that conflicts in which PGMs are present tend to last around 
3 times as long as conflicts in which PGMs are not present. Aliyev (2018) also finds that PGMs 
can prolong civil conflicts by making a negotiated settlement less likely and reducing the 
possibility of one side winning, re-producing low-intensity conflict. It is not yet clear if this 
extends to other forms of civil violence, or if the relationship is dependent on the type of militia 
force (beyond the link to the government).   
PGM interactions with rebels may also prolong violent conflict. PGMs are usually anti-
insurgent in nature and often target rebels during state-rebel peace talks, increasing the chances 
of spoiler activity (Steinert, Steinert, and Carey 2018; Aliyev 2018).  Peace can also threaten 
the existence of PGMs by undermining their relationship with state benefactors and 
endangering their access to sources of income. Ending a conflict, whether through victory, 
defeat, or negotiation, poses an existential threat to PGMs, therefore increasing the likelihood 
that these actors will be opposed to ending the conflict. 
Whilst in some cases the conflict-enhancing effect of militias might be desirable for the 
incumbent in the short-term, losing control of a PGM is unlikely to be favoured by the state. 
For once the genie is out the bottle there is no guarantee that a PGM will remain loyal and 
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produce the desired outcome. As such, existing literature pitches the use of militias as a 
dilemma in which states must often choose between maintaining a force monopoly that can be 
crucial for stability, economic development and the establishment of the rule of law, and a 
reduction in control over violent actors in return for the benefits associated with PGMs 
(Böhmelt and Clayton 2017; Carey and Mitchell 2016; Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014). We 
extend previous work in arguing that states often attempt to mitigate this principal-agent 
problem by recruiting militia with stronger ethnic ties to the state and that are expected to 
remain loyal. We focus on ethnicity in state-PGM ties before explaining incumbent incentives 
to use co-ethnic PGMs and the consequences this has for civil war dynamics. 
 
Ethnic Pro-Government Militias 
The salience of ethnicity is a prominent explanation for variation in the nature of civil violence. 
Conflicts fought over ethnic motivations are often both more deadly and last longer than 
ideological or opportunistic disputes. Yet the mechanisms through which ethnicity influences 
conflict remain contested (Lyall 2010; Kalyvas 2008; Seymour 2014; Warren and Troy, 2015). 
Most accounts associate intractable ethnic violence with the greater capacity of ethnic groups 
to overcome problems of collective action, and the greater intensity in which ethnic violence 
can polarize communities. Ethnic-based grievances often hold greater salience and offer a 
mobilization advantage for rebels recruiting from ethnic groups that are excluded from political 
power (Weinstein, 2007; Wucherpfennig, et al, 2012; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). 
The ascriptive nature of ethnicity also means that disputes can quickly escalate, further 
undermining a bargaining process (Eck 2009; Kaufmann 1996).  
However, existing accounts tend to define ethnic conflict monadically (i.e. conflict as 
a whole) or dyadically (i.e. relationship between the state and a rebel organisation). The former 
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approach offers a useful indication as to how conflicts with an ethnic dimension differ from 
those without, yet are poorly suited to distinguish between the different mechanisms that might 
produce this effect. Dyadic approaches offer greater potential to uncover support for a specific 
relationship, yet to date, the focus has been solely on the ethnic characteristics of the 
government (e.g. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013) or rebel forces (e.g. Wucherpfennig 
et al 2012), overlooking the influence of irregular state forces. 
As we are interested in explaining how the ethno-centric connections between the state 
and a PGM condition the latter’s influence on civil conflict dynamics, our focus is limited to 
PGMs, as distinct from other forms of militia, ethnic or otherwise, that are not pro-government. 
We do not discount the possible importance of other armed organisations, often referred to as 
“militias”, that may be ethnically mobilised, pro-rebel/anti-state or have no affiliations to 
armed actors at all  (e.g. Raleigh 2016; Alden, Thakur and Arnold 2011). Yet given the scope 
of this paper, we limit our discussion to PGMs.  
Ethnicity can be associated with PGMs in a number of ways (see Magid and Schon 
2018; Aliyev and Souleimanov 2018). We consider a militia group to be an ethnic pro-
government militia (EPGM) when a militia is clearly pro-government, not identified as a part 
of the regular security force, and are recruited specifically along ethnic lines, in order to uphold 
ethnic goals. EPGMs can be composed of individuals from a single ethnic group, or 
occasionally, a coalition of ethnic groups. Shared ethnic identity (whether real or imagined) 
forms the basis for militia recruitment, and thus inclusion or exclusion within the PGM. This 
is a common recruitment practice, for example the Uzbek Junbesh-e-Milli in Afghanistan, 
which recruit exclusively from the Uzbek community. PGM might also include non-native 
groups recruited from transnational ethnic kin. For example, the Army for the Liberation of 
Rwanda operates in the DRC alongside their Congolese Hutu kin. In addition, EPGMs are 
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formed (or co-opted) to uphold ethnic goals, such as the maintenance of a favourable political 
or economic distribution, or the protection of a specific part of the civilian population.  
Rather than seeing ethnic linkages as purely demographic, we place ethnic goals and 
civil war within the context of ethno-exclusive politics and contestation between ethnic groups 
that are included and excluded from political power (Wucherpfennig et al, 2012; Cederman, 
Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013). The government is not only active in the conflict but can also 
be ethnically biased. Ethnic incumbents often openly deploy ethno-exclusive policies as a 
strategy to consolidate the power and security of their own ethnic group and distribute state 
resources (i.e. patronage) to co-ethnics in exchange for political support (Posner, 2005; 
Roessler, 2011; Wimmer, 2013).1   
Incumbent incentives to co-opt or recruit EPGMs differ depending on whether they 
recruit from their own ethnic constituency (co-ethnics) or recruit from groups that are formed 
from the anti-government population (defectors). In turn, these types of EPGMs have different 
incentives to fight on behalf of the government. These differences are likely to influence the 
strength of the state-EPGM relationship, shaping EPGM loyalty to the state and commitment 
as a fighting force. Based on these varying ethnic ties we distinguish “co-ethnic PGMs” and 
“defector PGMs”. We believe this relational perspective posits that the strength and reliability 
of state-PGM relationship is important in determining conflict outcomes. 
Existing literature has largely focused on defector PGMs.  Defector PGMs are 
composed of local recruits drawn from the predominantly anti-government population, and 
thus whose use of violence in support of the state is explicitly opposed to the national 
aspirations of the ethnic group that they identify with (Magid and Schon 2018; Kalyvas 2008). 
Defector groups are normally composed of groups that are excluded from power, and also often 
include former members of an ethnic insurgency.  
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Counterinsurgency research points to a set of tactical advantages associated with 
defector PGMs, including disrupting rebel access to supporting communities and offering local 
knowledge on insurgents, which improve the selectivity of state targeting through overcoming 
the “identification problem” (Kalyvas 2008; Lyall 2010;).  These advantages are particularly 
acute where defector PGMs are recruited from side-switching or former rebel members 
(Clayton and Thomson 2016; Staniland 2012). Defector PGMs also help to “legitimize” the 
actions of the regime by challenging insurgent claims to be the sole representative of the 
excluded ethnic group, undermining intra-ethnic cohesion (Lyall, 2010).  In turn, recruits have 
incentives to join a defector PGM in order to gain token patronage from the state or seek state 
support in order to achieve predominance within their own consistency and gain security from 
rival factions. 
Yet incumbents can be less confident that the private incentives of a defector PGM are 
similar to their own, not least because they are formed from politically excluded, anti-
government populations which are prone to side-switching (Seymour, 2014).  Despite the 
short-term advantages of defector PGMs, their weak links to the state mean they are unlikely 
to be of sufficient size or loyalty to be considered a viable long-term strategy. Moreover, the 
lack of ties between the state and ethnic defector PGMs’ communities and loyalties to their 
ethnic group are likely to hinder widespread recruitment into defector PGMs. For example, the 
Kurdish Village Guards in Turkey were branded as “traitors” for their opposition to the PKK 
and were marginalized within Kurdish communities, helping to prevent mass conscription 
(Gurcan, 2015). Defectors also have a proven history of desertion if confronted with significant 
threats during intense periods of violence (Souleimanov, Aliyev, and Ratelle 2018). 
On the other hand, states have different incentives to mobilize or co-opt co-ethnic 
groups. Incumbents often try to preserve their ethnic groups’ privileged position and ensure 
their regime’s survival in ethno-political exclusionary contexts by limiting military 
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recruitment, advancement and patronage to their ethnic kin, and thereby maintain control over 
military institutions (e.g. Harkness, 2016).  Recruiting from ethnic kin is more likely to provide 
a convenient way of organizing armed recruitment, as it is often more salient and ‘sticky’ than 
other recruitment categories (e.g. ideology) (Eck, 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 
2013; Jentzsch, 2014). Due to its salience, recruitment along ethnic lines lowers coordination 
costs and makes potential loyalists and recruits more easily identifiable (Eck, 2009). 
 Some incumbents have attempted to build co-ethnic armies and promote co-ethnics to 
key military positions. Yet this process of ‘ethnic stacking’ is relatively rare because it is 
difficult to implement and is often not a viable option during armed conflict. Attempts to build 
ethnic armies, or reform those created by their predecessors, often motivates coups and violent 
resistance from military officers of out-groups as well as counter-coups (Harkness, 2016). In 
the Central African Republic (CAR), President Patassé’s attempts to promote Northern military 
personnel led to three ethnic mutinies by Southern factions of the army. In most cases, 
incumbents inherit multi-ethnic armies, and thereby cannot ensure the loyalty of certain 
factions within the security forces. For instance, various Tutsi army commanders in the Forces 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have defected during armed rebellions. 
Moreover, a state’s capacity to engage in violence also depends upon the strength and 
depth of the armed forces. Civil conflict more commonly occurs in weak states that lack 
presence in peripheral hard-to-reach areas and have limited conventional military capacity to 
repel insurgent threats. To influence the military dispute, weak states often require quick force 
multipliers and rely on large numbers of civilians who are willing to take up arms for their 
cause (Böhmelt and Clayton, 2017), and within the context of ethnic politics, hold sufficient 
loyalty that they remain committed throughout intense periods of violence. 
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A common strategy is to mobilize or co-opt irregular PGM forces that share a similar 
ethnicity to the incumbent government. Incumbents delegate violence to co-ethnic PGMs in 
order to circumnavigate the principal-agent problem (Kirschke, 2000; McLaughlin, 2010) and 
augment military capacity while evading responsibility for violence (Raleigh and Kishi 2018). 
Ruling elites can be more confident that militia groups share similar incentives when they are 
comprised of in-group members. Co-ethnic PGMs, in turn, are motivated to protect a status-
quo that is advantageous to their group, including a favourable share and distribution of 
economic and state resources.  
Additionally other private incentives are also more likely to be compatible with the 
incumbents’. For example, whilst co-ethnic PGMs might have incentives to engage in deviant 
behaviour that undermines state control; looting, sexual violence and personally motivated 
attacks, these actions are more likely to be targeted at opposing ethnic groups, rather than the 
constituencies upon which incumbents depend. Incumbents therefore have incentives to use 
co-ethnic PGMs as ‘protection forces’ to maintain ethno-political power, pitting them as 
counterinsurgents against insurgent forces from other ethnic groupings (Schneckener, 
2006:26). For example, various administrations in the Philippines have relied upon co-
Christian PGMs to target Muslim separatists in Mindanao, and similarly with the Anti-Terrorist 
Unit in Liberia where Charles Taylor specifically recruited from Gio and Mano to supress 
excluded ethnic opposition forces. Building on this overview of defector PGMs and co-ethnic 
PGMs, we argue below that co-ethnic PGMs are likely to have clear and observable 
consequences on violence during civil war.  
 
Co-ethnic Pro-Government Militia and the Dynamics of Civil War 
Co-ethnic PGMs and Conflict Intensity 
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We expect that co-ethnic PGM-government ties will be associated with high-intensity 
conflicts.  Firstly, co-ethnic PGMs are expected to be associated with greater civil violence on 
account of the recruitment advantage that they offer. As discussed above, the stronger ties 
between the state and a co-ethnic militia provides the basis for quick mobilization of a 
committed and loyal fighting force, which can facilitate increased levels of civil violence (e.g. 
Eck 2009).  Due to their salience, common ethnic ties form a clear obligation for members to 
protect their group’s collective common interests (Wucherpfennig, et al, 2012). Co-ethnic 
PGM recruits share in the spoils of ethno-political power, rendering such groups more likely 
to remain loyal and fight on to uphold the favourable co-ethnic regime (Kirschke, 2000; 
McLaughlin, 2010).  In this way, co-ethnic groups serve as loyal force multipliers, bolstering 
state military capabilities and allowing the state to more quickly and violently respond to 
challengers. For example, the creation of co-ethnic militias was pivotal to sustaining Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Assad was able to escalate the dispute to resist growing rebel threats 
in the early phases of the conflict largely due loyal Alawite force of 60,000 men, quickly 
recruited under the banner of the National Defense Force (Carter Center, 2013). This loose 
collection of co-ethnic militia prevented rebel advances by intensifying the violence at the local 
level, challenging rebel control neighborhood by neighborhood across the state.  
Second, the strength of the state relationship with co-ethnic PGMs can also influence 
the intensity of civil violence by in effect accentuating the information problem. Co-ethnic 
militia (by definition) do not share common ethnic ties with insurgent groups or the 
communities from which they hail. Without intimate knowledge of their “enemies” and the 
communities in which they reside, co-ethnic PGMs are therefore more likely to employ 
indiscriminate forms of violence against perceived enemy groups, rather than selectively target 
insurgents (Aliyev and Souleimanov 2018; Kalyvas 2006). For violently targeting civilians 
groups in which insurgents reside, and those of similar ethnic makeup to the insurgents, is often 
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believed to weaken challengers, and is more likely when actors are mobilised on the basis of 
ethnic identity (Fjelde and Hultman 2014).   
Thirdly, since co-ethnic militias are created or co-opted to preserve exclusionary ethno-
political hierarchies, they can often escalate and exacerbate ethnic divisions increasing the 
intensity of violence between groups (Eck, 2009; Roessler, 2016). For members of co-ethnic 
PGMs, on account of their recruitment and composition, are prone to extreme ethnic views, 
and thus view ethno-political dominance as legitimate and justified. This is likely to lead to 
greater violence between groups. An earlier study offered some preliminary evidence to this 
effect, showing that co-ethnic militia in African conflicts that are committed to defending a 
particular ethnically defined political party, regime, or elite, tend to perpetrate higher levels of 
human rights violations than other types of ethnic PGMs (such as defectors) (Magid and Schon 
2018). On some occasions this violence might be the intention of the ruling regime, who use 
militia forces to avoid responsibility for violence used on their behalf (e.g. Raleigh and Kishi 
2018; Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015). In other cases, it might be the by-product of using 
PGMs that are less accountable and less disciplined than the official armed forces. Thus despite 
the increased loyalty of co-ethnic PGMs to the state, such unofficial forces are likely to 
continue to pose significant risks to civilians. This is particularly the case for members of ethnic 
out-groups. 
For example, during both Sudanese civil wars, the government enabled the mobilization 
of Arab-Muslim militias by appealing to a common identity to tackle insurgents composed 
predominantly of African ethnic groupings (Johnson, 2003: 44-49, 83; Idris, 2005: 53-56; 
Martin, 2002: 120). The Sudanese Armed Forces were composed of conscripts from a variety 
of ethnic groups and tribal affiliations, meaning they were often reluctant to commit violence 
against their perceived ethnic kin (Idris, 2005: 88; Martin, 2002: 117). In comparison, co-ethnic 
PGMs were often more loyal to the state and willing to exercise violence in a way that both 
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augmented state capacity and limited state accountability for actions taken on its behalf. The 
ability of the state to quickly mobilize a significant militia force composed of co-ethnic groups 
was an advantage that intensified the violent dispute and exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions 
between the Arab-Muslim and African populations (Idris, 2005). Similarly, in response to 
mounting opposition in Darfur, the government of Sudan was able to rely on a swift and 
significant military offensive using the Janjaweed that escalated the conflict across the region, 
in particular through the use of widespread indiscriminate violence and the exacerbation of 
ethnic tensions. In both cases, the recruitment of co-ethnic militias were pivotal in escalating 
violence. From this discussion we derive our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Conflict months in which co-ethnic PGM are present are likely to be 
associated with more conflict fatalities than conflict months in which co-ethnic PGMS 
are absent.  
 
Co-ethnic PGMs and Conflict Duration  
Government ties with co-ethnic PGMs are also likely to influence the duration of a 
dispute. Firstly, as we discussed above, the recruitment advantage associated with co-ethnic 
PGM creates larger and more loyal forces. This increases the resilience of a regime, in 
particular its ability to sustain long periods of fighting. Irregular forces are prone to defection 
and side-switching during civil conflict, and according to a principal-agent logic, PGMs (i.e. 
agents) that operate outside of the state’s (i.e. principal’s) control are often likely to renege on 
their commitment if not sufficiently monitored or enforced.  This is less of a problem for co-
ethnic actors, as they share in the benefits of ethno-political power, and are more likely to 
remain loyal throughout an armed struggle (Kirschke, 2000; McLaughlin, 2010). The existent 
system of patronage and government’s promises of future benefits further cement this loyalty 
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(Eck, 2009). Conversely, if defeated, co-ethnic groups (and their kin) are at serious risk of 
deadly reprisals further increasing their loyalty and commitment (Eck, 2009; Kirschner, 2010).  
Yet despite the recruitment and subsequent loyalty gains associated with co-ethnic 
PGMs, these advantages are often insufficient to comprehensively win a conflict. In 
comparison to state forces, they tend to be poorly trained, equipped and lacking in 
specialisation (Böhmelt and Clayton 2017). Thus the additional numbers tend only to offer a 
defensive advantage, reducing the likelihood of defeat and the need to make significant 
concessions. For example, in Angola the Civil Defence Organisation, comprised from the 
governing Mbundu group, helped provide state protection by creating an additional protective 
zone around the capital, rather than actively engaging the insurgent force. As such, whilst co-
ethnics can often help to sustain a dispute, they rarely hold the capacity to comprehensively 
defeat an opponent.  
Co-ethnic PGM are also likely to influence the duration of conflict by further 
exacerbating inter-ethnic divisions. The use of ethno-exclusive forces associates violence and 
ethnicity, increasing “politicization of identity-based cleavages” (Alden, Thukur and Arnold 
2011: 37-39; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2010). This prevents effective bargaining prior to 
violence (Roessler, 2011), and hinders peacemaking during war (Denny and Walter, 2014). 
While this might help the state to recruit from its own population, as the process that 
exacerbates interethnic competition also produces intra-group cohesion (Kaufmann, 1996), it 
simultaneously enhances the rebel’s ability to recruit and gain support among their ethnically 
excluded constituency (Denny and Walter, 2014). This reduces the likelihood of peaceful 
resolution and the prospect of a conflict petering out. For example, in Indonesia heavy-handed 
tactics, including the use of Javanese militias, helped to boost support for Acehnese separatists. 
In Sudan the mobilization of PGMs along exclusionary ethnic lines intensified the shared ethnic 
identity and “Arabness” among recruits but polarized their “African” neighbours (Idris, 2005), 
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which enhanced the ability of insurgent factions to mobilize among excluded ethnic groups. 
Over time, this has entrenched ethnic divisions between the north and the south that helped to 
sustain recruitment for violence. 
Similarly, by recruiting along ethnically exclusionary lines, co-ethnic PGMs are more 
prone to extreme ethnic views, and thus become spoilers in any process that might challenge 
their domination (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). More generally, co-ethnic PGMs 
are therefore likely to resist policies that jeopardize their prominent position (Staniland, 2012).  
In this context, the loyalty of a co-ethnic PGM pivots from the ethno-political regime to the 
broader group they claim to represent (Carey and Mitchell, 2017). For example, in Ukraine, 
EPGMs have constantly undermined the government, which they now accuse of betraying the 
Ukrainian people in seeking negotiations with the rebels (Aliyev, 2016). Taken together the 
above discussion leads to a second observable implication.  
Hypothesis 2:– Civil conflicts in which co-ethnic PGM are present are associated with 
longer civil conflict duration than civil conflicts in which co-ethnic PGM are absent.  
 
Research Design 
Measuring Ethnic PGMs 
Co-ethnic PGMs are the key independent variable in our analysis. We first operationalize 
EPGMs using the Pro-Government Militia (PGM) dataset (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013). 
The PGM dataset includes 331 PGMs active between 1981 and 2007, and offers the original 
news sources used to code each militia group. We use this online database, and where necessary 
evidence from other sources to apply our coding criteria for EPGMs. In total, we coded 186 of 
the 331 militias as EPGMs.2 We coded EPGM that meet both of the following criteria: 
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1. Recruitment: PGM membership is restricted to a specific politically relevant ethnic 
group (or groups).3 There needs to be clear evidence of an ethnic criterion associated 
with group membership.4 For example, the Uzbek Junbesh-e-Milli in Afghanistan. 
Recruitment is not limited to one ethnic group, as sometimes EPGMs are composed of 
different ethnic constituencies.5  
 
2. Role: activities support a particular ethnic group (or a coalition of groups). To ensure 
that ethnic mobilization is not a strategy of convenience, we also require evidence that 
the group seeks to support or threaten a particular group based on ethnicity.  This 
excludes mercenary groups operating for economic motivations, such as Chadian 
groups operating in CAR. 
 
Having coded each EPGM, we then link these militias to their respective ethno-political 
power status using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 
2009). Our approach develops the method previously used to capture the ethnic characteristics 
of insurgents (e.g. Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). We first identify the politically relevant ethnic 
group(s) that the EPGM represents, then match this to the EPR data to determine if that group(s) 
linked to that militia are included or excluded from political power.6 EPGMs recruited from a 
ruling group (or coalition) are coded as co-ethnic PGM. For example, the Special Security 
Service in Liberia was set up by Charles Taylor to uphold government power, and recruited 
specifically from his Gio and Mano support base.7 To code defector groups, i.e. those 
composed of ethnically defined anti-government populations, we record which militia were 
composed of individuals from the same ethnicity as the rebels. Finally, we code the rare 
EPGMs that do not share the same ethnicity as the government or insurgents (non-coethnic 
PGMs).  We lag our independent variables to ensure causal ordering, otherwise we risk 
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including PGMs that are active after a conflict has intensified in a given month on the right-
hand side. We rerun all analyses using non-lagged variables in the appendix.  
We adjust our coding to changes in ethno-political power. This is illustrated by the 
Uzbek Junbesh-e-Milli which are only classified as co-ethnic between 1993 and 1996, as this 
is the only period Uzbek representatives had posts in the executive. Of the 186 EPGMs, we 
classify 135 as co-ethnic PGMs and 54 as defector PGMs. As figure 1 shows, co-ethnic PGMs 
are a global phenomenon, but are more common where ethnicity is salient. 
 
Figure 1: Global Distribution of Co-ethnic PGMs Presence 1981-2007 
 
 
Data Structure and Modeling Approach  
To assess the influence of co-ethnic PGMs on conflict intensity we draw on the UCDP Global 
events data (GED). Since the GED starts in 1989 and the PGM data is limited to 2007, our 
analysis focuses on the period 1989-2007. The fine-grain character of the GED and the dates 
of emergence in the PGM data allow us to disaggregate each conflict year into a count of 
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conflict fatalities in each month. Our dataset includes 15615 conflict months, of which 51% 
include the presence of a co-ethnic PGM. Since our dependent variable is a count of fatalities 
there is likely to be overdispersion in this data, we therefore use a negative binomial regression 
model in this analysis.8 
To asses potential effects that co-ethnic PGMs have on conflict duration, we use a series 
of Cox proportional hazard models to estimate how co-ethnic and PGMs shape the hazard rate 
of conflict termination. For this analysis, our dependent variable is conflict termination 
(hazard). This is measured using the start and end date of a conflict in the UCDP data – 
calculating the number of days from when a conflict meets the criteria to enter into the UCDP 
data, until the day it meets the criteria for termination (i.e. battle-related fatalities drops below 
25 for at least a year) (Kreutz, 2010). This data consists of 501518 conflict days (unit of 
analysis) within 1,214 conflict years, of which there are 233 conflict terminations in total.9 
 
Controls 
To account for omitted variable bias, we include a number of control variables that relate to 
conflict duration and the emergence of pro-government militias. In particular, we account for 
key state characteristics, including regime type using the Polity IV measure (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2006), since instability and the proliferation of militias has been associated with states 
transitioning into democracy (Raleigh, 2016). We also include GDP per capita (Gleditsch 
2002), to account for instability and state weakness where PGMs are likely to feature (Böhmelt 
and Clayton 2017; Carey and Mitchell, 2017; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger, 2015).  
We also account for key conflict characteristics, including controls for the presence of 
other conflicts, and whether the conflict is protracted (i.e. involved more than one episode of 
violence) (Gleditsch et al, 2002). We then control for whether the conflict is over territory or 
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governmental control (Gleditsch et al, 2002).10 We also introduce controls accounting for rebel 
groups recruited along ethnic lines and that make ethnic claims, and the size of the ethnically 
discriminated population (Wucherpfennig et al, 2012). Since ethnic conflicts are generally 
prolonged and likely to involve greater violence, we explore the effect of PGMs independent 
from that of ethnic conflict. Finally, in the analysis on conflict intensity, we include temporal 
controls for battlefield violence (t-3), as previously violence can drive current intensity. We 
also control for the number of conflict months. 
 
Results 
Coethnic PGMs and Conflict Intensity 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that co-ethnic militia are associated with high intensity violence. We 
assess this using negative binomial regression models and present the results on table 1. Model 
1 offers a baseline, including only our indicators of PGMs and controls for the duration of 
conflict and lagged count of fatalities. Model 2 then includes controls for conflict 
characteristics. As we expected, the co-ethnic militia variable reports a positive coefficient that 
is statistically significant in both models. To ensure that we are not simply picking up the effect 
of ethnic conflict, in model 3 we also control for the presence of ethnic insurgent groups and 
the size of the discriminated ethnic population. As hypothesized, conflict fought around ethnic 
cleavages is associated with high levels of civil violence, but this does not change the positive 
and significant effect of co-ethnic PGMs.  
 
Table 1: Negative binomial regression models – Conflict Intensity  
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 Robust Standard errors (clustered on conflict) in parentheses      + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Statistical significance is important in evaluating variable effects, but we are also interested in 
the substantive impact of co-ethnic militia. For this purpose, we calculate marginal effects to 
assess the extent to which the presence of co-ethnic militia influences the predicted counts of 
fatalities during civil conflict, holding all other variables at their mean values. Across models 
1-3, coethnic PGMs produce a significant increase of 14 to 17 fatalities per month, representing 
approximately a 19% increase from the mean of 91 fatalities per month (see figure 2).  
22 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Monthly Battlefield Deaths 
 
As we discuss above, co-ethnic militia could result from, rather than contribute to, high 
intensity violence. Whilst we do not discount the strategic calculations likely to motivate the 
co-option of co-ethnic PGMs, nor exclude the possibility that states facing high-intensity 
conflict might turn to co-ethnic militia, we account for this potential endogeneity by matching 
pair observations that featured a co-ethnic militia with similar observations without such a 
group. This removes observations without a co-ethnic militia that lack an analogue among the 
cases with a co-ethnic group (Ho et al. 2007). Pre-processing our data in this manner allows us 
to better assess the effect that co-ethnics produce independent of the conflict dynamics that 
might be more likely to produce such groups. We identify pairs using the MatchIt package in 
R, adopting 1:1 nearest neighbour matching with replacement (Ho et al. 2006). This produces 
5565 pairs of control and treatment observations from the original sample of 15615 conflict 
months.  
Having matched our data we rerun models 2 and 3, presenting the results as models 4 
and 5. The results remain positive and significant, and the marginal effects of co-ethnic produce 
and equivalent effect (i.e. increase the predicted monthly count of fatalities by 14 to 16 
fatalities), offering further support for hypothesis 1.  
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Table 2: Negative binomial regression models – Conflict Intensity  
 
 
The results thus far indicate that conflict months are more violent when co-ethnic PGMs are 
present. However, this effect could be driven simply by the presence of PGMs. While models 
2 through 5 control for other forms of militia, this does not assess the influence of co-ethnics 
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PGMs relative to other PGM.  We therefore divide the “other” militia category, and rerun the 
analysis including two variables for other ethnic PGMs: defectors, other ethnic PGMs, and 
non-coethnic PGMs. Finally, we also control for non-ethnic PGMs. We present the results for 
the baseline sample in model 6, followed by the full sample in model 7 and the matched sample 
in model 8. We find further evidence that co-ethnic militia are associated with higher levels of 
violence, and also find that this effect is not extended to other forms of PGM.  
To assess this difference statistically, we next limit our sample to conflict months in 
which militias are present, and rerun the analysis comparing the effect of co-ethnic militia to 
other forms of PGM. In essence, the coefficient for the co-ethnic militia variable in models 9 
and 10 indicates the effect of co-ethnic PGMs relative to all other militias. The marginal effects 
suggest that co-ethnic PGMs increase the number of fatalities by between 14 (model 9) and 17 
(model 10) per month. This suggests that co-ethnic militia, relative to other forms of PGM, are 
more likely to be associated with greater civil violence. 
To assess the robustness of our findings we changed a number of model specifications 
and reran the estimates. We present these results in an accompanying online appendix (OA).  
While using conflict months allows us to utilize fine-grain conflict event data and specific dates 
capturing militia emergence, it could be argued that this approach inflates our sample by 
artificially creating additional observations. As a result, we first rerun our analysis using 
conflict years (Table OA1). The results remain consistent. 
Next, we lag the independent variables to ensure causal ordering between active militias 
and levels of armed violence. However, when operating at the monthly level this is less of a 
risk, and might bias our results. We therefore rerun the analysis without lagging any variables. 
The results remain consistent (Table OA2). 
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In our analysis we opt for a parsimonious model focusing on the factors most likely to 
influence conflict intensity. However, there are other factors that might influence the intensity 
of a dispute and/or the presence of PGMs. We therefore rerun the analysis including a number 
of other possible cofounders (Table OA2). First, we account for other opportunity-based factors 
(i.e. Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009), and include measures capturing the percentage of 
mountainous territory, drug production, hydrocarbon extraction, gemstone extraction, whether 
the conflict zone borders another state, and the number of contiguous states. Second, we 
account for international mediators (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna, 2011), and 
peacekeeping (Hegre, Hultman and Nygard, 2015). Third, to account for the relative fighting 
capacity of the disputants we include an indicator measuring the relative capacity of the rebel 
force (Cunningham, 2006). Finally, we control for decentralization and whether a state has a 
federal system which has been related to the pacification of ethnic disputes and may reduce 
conflict intensity (Cederman et al., 2015). In all cases our results remain consistent.  
Whilst our results suggest a strong association between co-ethnics and conflict 
intensity, we return to potential interceding effects of ethnic conflict. We divide our sample 
into ethnic and non-ethnic conflict, defined by the presence of ethnic rebels (Table OA3). The 
effect of co-ethnic militias is positive for both. As previously argued, this suggests that co-
ethnic militia relate to ethnic politics more broadly, are not limited to conflict between ethnic 
groups and influence conflict dynamics through multiple mechanisms. While our results 
suggest ethnic PGMs do exacerbate ethnic divisions, our findings extend to non-ethnic conflict, 
offering further validation of our arguments relating to the recruitment and loyalty advantages 
offered by co-ethnic PGMs.  
To ensure that our findings are not driven by conflict months with particularly extreme 
levels of violence, we limit our analysis to exclude months with more than 5000 (4 months), 
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3000 (21 months), 2000 (45 months) and 1000 (164 months) deaths. Next we run jackknife 
estimations to account for potential outliers; control for the number of co-ethnic PGMs, as 
countries with more PGMs may be driving the results; and control for cases where co-ethnic 
PGMs are active prior to the conflict (Table OA4). In all cases the results remain consistent. 
We do not include fixed effects in the prior analysis because of the low level of within-
case variation on our partially time invariant explanatory variable, which can eliminate “too 
much” cross-sectional variance and severely bias our estimates (Plumper, Troeger, and Manow 
2005, 330–34). However, as an additional check we run the analysis including country as well 
as random effects. The results show a consistent effect of co-ethnic militias (Table OA5).  
Next, we account for whether different temporal lags and model choice is driving our 
results (Table OA6). We use shorter (t-1) and longer time lags (t-6, t-12, t-12 sq) and use a 
OLS regression model, with a logged DV, as an alternative to our negative binomial models 
with a highly skewed DV with many zeros. Our results remain the same.  
Finally, whilst it is clearly important to control for the effect of other militia groups, 
including co-ethnic and other militias in the same model risks introducing bias through 
autocorrelation. As such, we adopt an alternative approach, including two dummy variables 
measuring the presence of any PGM (including co-ethnic) and co-ethnic PGM. In this set up, 
the co-ethnic variable effectively represents an interaction term, showing the conditional effect 
of co-ethnic relative to other PGMs.11 Once again only co-ethnic PGMs are shown to have a 
significant conflict enhancing effect.12 Taken together, we therefore find strong support for 
hypothesis 1.  
 
Coethnic PGMs and Conflict Duration  
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that co-ethnic PGMs are associated with longer civil conflicts. States 
drawing on co-ethnic groups are expected to be more resilient to rebel threats, which is likely 
to produce longer conflicts. We assess these claims using Cox proportional hazard models in 
which conflict termination is the baseline hazard. To ensure first ordering, we lag time-varying 
covariates by one year (t-1), and cluster the standard errors by conflict to address possible 
dependency in conflict episodes. For ease of interpretation we report coefficient estimates 
rather than the hazard ratios; negative coefficients indicate a lower likelihood of termination, 
and thus longer expected duration, while positive signs indicate a higher probability of 
termination and thus shorter conflicts.  
We adopt a similar set up to the prior analysis. In model 11, we show the baseline 
model, then include key conflict characteristics (model 12) and include additional controls to 
account for ethnic conflict (model 13). As we are no longer limited by the temporal span of the 
Uppsala GED data, we expand our analysis to the full period covered by the PGM database 
(1981-2007). As such, we include an additional controls to account for the post-Cold War 
period and for conflict intensity which was not needed in the prior analysis.  
The results offer strong support for hypothesis 2. In both models the co-ethnic militia 
variable shows the expected negative impact, indicating a reduction in the likelihood of 
termination, and thus longer duration. Co-ethnic PGMs have a notable and significant effect, 
reducing the baseline hazard (likelihood of termination) by between 40 and 62% in our full 
sample.  
 
 
Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Models: EPGMs, and Conflict Duration 
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However, our full sample findings do not discount the possibility that there is something 
fundamentally different about the cases in which co-ethnic militia are used, which both leads 
to the production of co-ethnic PGMs, and the longer duration. We were unable to identify a 
suitable instrument to isolate the independent effect of co-ethnic groups, so again account for 
observable factors using matching. Adopting 1:1 nearest neighbour matching with replacement 
(Ho et al. 2007) produces 393 pairs of control and treatment observations. As models 14 and 
15 show, our analysis of the matched dataset adds further support for our hypotheses as co-
29 
 
ethnic PGMS produce a strong and significant effect in the direction we predicted. This adds 
further support to our theoretical claims and helps to address confounding explanations related 
to endogeneity. 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survivor function– Model 12 
 
To visualize these effects, figure 2 presents the Kaplan-Meier predicted survivor function (y-
axis). The co-ethnic PGMs line is consistently higher than the no-PGMs line across the entire 
conflict lifecycle, in which cases with conflicts are on average more 20% likely to endure when 
co-ethnic PGMs are active when compare to conflicts without PGMs. The biggest impacts are 
in the earlier stages of conflict. For instance, in the third year of a civil conflict (or 1,095 days), 
the likelihood of conflict continuing is 30% higher when co-ethnic PGMs are present than 
conflicts containing no PGMs, and 20% higher when compared to conflicts with other PGMs. 
Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Models: EPGMs, and Conflict Duration 
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AS with the prior analysis it is important to check whether the relationship we observe, between 
co-ethnic PGMs and civil war duration, is not driven by the mere presence of PGMs. Again we 
disaggregate the “other” military category into: defectors, other ethnic PGMs and non-coethnic 
PGMs. Models 16-18 provide further evidence that co-ethnic PGMs increase the duration of 
civil war. We find no such evidence for other forms of PGM. We then limit our sample to only 
31 
 
conflict years in which PGMs are present, which compares co-ethnic PGMs with all other 
PGMs. Models 19-20 show that co-ethnic PGMs are more likely to be associate with prolonged 
conflict than other types of PGM.   
The control variables behave largely as expected. Conflicts are shorter in the post-Cold 
War period and conflicts are likely to be longer with higher intensity, which is often associated 
with ethnic actors (Eck, 2009). Regime type and GDP have no significant effect. Finally, and 
most surprisingly, we find little evidence that the number of parallel conflicts or ethnic rebels 
increase the duration of civil war, despite fragmentation and ethnically mobilized rebels 
previously being shown to increase conflict duration.   
To ensure the robustness of our findings we again change a number of specifications. 
Firstly, we included a number of additional controls to ensure our results are not driven by 
omitted variables. One challenge is that weak state capacity might explain both to the use of 
co-ethnic PGM and longer conflicts. In our main analyses we proxy for this using GDP per 
capita. To explore this further we add additional variables (Hendrix and Young, 2014): state 
capacity, generated using a factor analysis of International Country Risk Guide variables 
(bureaucracy quality, and law and order), and military capacity, also derived from a factor 
analysis (combines military personnel, military expenditures, and military expenditures per 
soldier). The results remain consistent (Table OA7), offering further evidence that co-ethnics 
have an effect independent of the weak contexts where they are likely to emerge in.  
 Another alternative explanation might be that our co-ethnic PGM variable is capturing 
effects an ethno-political context that are related to the emergence of ethnic PGMs and durable 
civil war. We account for this in our model, but here include additional measures including the 
size of the ethnically excluded population and the largest excluded group (Wucherpfennig et 
al, 2012). Across both analyses, the co-ethnic militia are the only indicator of ethnicity with 
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consistent conflict-enhancing effects (Table OA7). This suggests that whilst political exclusion 
increases the likelihood of civil conflict, we find little evidence of its conflict-enhancing effect. 
We then control for federalism, which can reduce the duration of disputes that are underway. 
Our results do not change. 
Thirdly, whilst EPGMs operate in many continents, ethnicity is most often associated 
with African conflicts, which also tend to be longer. To ensure our results are not limited to a 
specific region we include a series of regional controls and conduct jackknife estimations to 
account for possible outliers (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). Moreover, we 
change the specification to cluster standard errors by conflict episodes and then by country 
(instead of by conflict). In all cases the results remain consistent (Table OA8).   
We then explore other alternative explanations. First, the role of opportunity factors 
including resources and favourable geographic conditions that have previously been shown to 
influence a rebel group’s ability to sustain conflict (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009), whilst 
also motivating the creation of a PGM force. Here we include additional controls for the 
presence of lootable gemstones, oil, mountainous terrain in the conflict zone, and the distance 
from the conflict zone to the capital and nearest border. Second, we account for more capable 
rebel organisations (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009) and relative rebel strength 
in relation to the government. The results further support our findings (Table OA9). 
Next we explore whether modelling assumptions are responsible for the results (also 
Table OA9). The Cox model we use allows the inclusion of covariates of survival times, but 
has less restrictive assumptions than the Weibull model. Yet, our results remain the same when 
rerun the analysis with a Weibull model. Next we use a logit model to assess the influence of 
EPGMs on conflict termination. Our measure of co-ethnic PGM performs consistently well. 
The co-ethnic variable produces a 50% reduction in the likelihood of termination when all other 
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variables are held constant. In-sample analysis reveals that removing the co-ethnic variable 
significantly reduces the predictive power (Figure OA1). Next, we explore the possibility that 
our measure of conflict duration is driving the results. Gates and Strand (2004) show that 
different measures can produce dissimilar results. We run the analysis with an alternative 
calculation of conflict duration - the number of civil war months, and then years. The results 
are consistent regardless of how we calculate duration.   
Finally, it could be that co-ethnic PGMs are an endogenous feature of conflict duration. 
States might turn to EPGMs as reinforcements in a long drawn-out conflict. We do not totally 
discount the possibility that states turn to militias later in a dispute,13 as our theory predicts that 
co-ethnic PGMs increase state resilience, which could be required early or late in a conflict. If 
it were the case, we would expect to observe relatively fewer co-ethnic militia in earlier years 
of a conflict than in later years. This is not what we see in the data, since co-ethnic PGMs are 
active in all stages of a conflict lifespan. Relatively speaking, co-ethnic PGMs appear in 36% 
of conflicts in the year of onset, increases steadily to a high of 59% of conflict in their eighth 
year and then remaining largely stable around 50% of conflicts in subsequent years (see Figure 
OA2). Moreover, the initial perceived increase in co-ethnic PGMS appears to be driven by a 
reduction in conflicts that do not include co-ethnic EPGMs, rather than the later introduction 
of new PGMs. We explore this further by assessing the impact of co-ethnic PGMs on conflict 
termination at five-year intervals using logit models (Table OA10). Across all periods (years 
0-5, 5-10, 10-15 and 15-20) co-ethnic PGMs are consistently related to a lower likelihood of 
conflict termination. Moreover, when comparing subset cases where co-ethnic PGMs were 
active prior to conflict with those active during conflict, we find that both have an impact on 
the longer duration of armed conflict, with the coefficient slightly stronger for coethnic PGMs 
that mobilize prior to the conflict. This further alleviates concerns of endogeneity. 
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Conclusion 
In this article, we argue that PGMs recruited along co-ethnic lines have a previously 
overlooked influence on conflict dynamics. States facing internal challenges often turn to co-
ethnic militia that are quickly mobilized as loyal force multipliers. We show that the presence 
of co-ethnic PGMs is often associated with more intense and longer civil wars compared to 
other forms of ethnic and non-ethnic PGMs. We argue that this is a result of a combination of 
factors.  First, the strong relationship between the state and co-ethnic groups provides the state 
with a loyal fighting force and enhances the state’s capacity to resist insurgent challenges. 
Second, despite the loyalty of co-ethnic groups to the state, such irregular forces are often less 
accountable than official armed forces, can pose higher risks to civilians and have incentives 
to undermine peacemaking attempts that could compromise their ethnic group’s privileged 
status. Third, because co-ethnic PGMs are usually deployed against insurgents made up of an 
excluded ethnic group, co-ethnic PGMs play a significant role in increasing inter-ethnic 
polarization and ethnic extremism. We find support for these arguments in a statistical analysis 
using new data, which for the first time, captures the ethnic affiliations of PGMs across a global 
sample of cases from 1981-2007.  
This study makes a contribution to our understanding of how state-military relations 
influence conflict dynamics, in particular concerning PGMs. A collection of work has begun 
to explore the effects that PGMs have inside and outside of civil war, but has until now 
overlooked the role of ethnicity. Similarly, while the civil war literature has advanced in 
showing how conflict intensity and duration are shaped by the ethnic character of insurgents, 
and the distribution of power across ethnic groups, this work has until now missed the 
important effect of co-ethnic PGMs (Eck, 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013; 
Wucherpfennig et al 2012). Conventional wisdom currently holds that PGMs more generally 
(i.e. non-ethnic militias) can have adverse effects because states lose control of or are unwilling 
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to control their agents. By bringing together principal-agent theory and ethnic grievances 
arguments, we demonstrate that the ethnic ties that bind a PGM to those in power can have 
adverse effects, in which co-ethnic PGMs insulate incumbents from challengers but 
simultaneously exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions.  
Our findings also have important implications for the policy community. In Iraq, for 
example, our findings suggest that the Shia-dominated militias used to repel the ISIS advance 
are likely to act as a serious impediment to peace. A challenge for the Iraqi government will be 
to find ways to reign in Shia militia or incorporate them into official military structures. Future 
research could, for example, examine the conditions in which co-ethnic PGMs are more likely 
to disarm. Similarly, our analysis suggests that co-ethnic PGMs operating in the Philippines 
might undermine the bargaining process with Muslim rebels in Mindanao. Determining how 
to incorporate co-ethnic PGMs into a peace process would be another important and timely 
extension of this research.   
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Notes 
1 Also see Wucherpfennig et al (2012) and Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) on the 
‘logic of ethno-political exclusion’. 
2 For a full list of cases, see online appendix (Table OA11). 
3 The requirement of political relevance excludes groups whose membership is based on 
localized group ties rather than a clear ethnic identity. This excludes regionally defined groups 
that do not meet the threshold of an ethnic identity such as the post-independence death squads 
in East-Timor. 
4 We provide evidence and sources for each PGM that we code. 
5 Our approach is akin to that used in the ACD2EPR dataset. Some PGMs have linkages with 
multiple groups, and some ethnic constituencies link to multiple PGMs.  For example, we 
code the Kebele militia in Ethiopia as a co-ethnic PGM as it is composed of a coalition of 
ethnic groups that share power, whereas the multi-ethnic Basij militia in Iran is not, as it 
recruits on ideological lines. In Sudan, while many Arab militias are recruited from a 
different tribe to those in power, we code them as co-ethnic based on shared Arab identity. 
6 Following the EPR data, political power relates to control over the presidency, cabinet, or 
senior posts within the executive. 
7 Unlike the PGM dataset, the recently released African Relational Pro Government Militia 
Dataset (RPGMD) (Magid and Schon 2018) is limited to African years after 1997. 
8 Likelihood ratio tests confirm that our data is overdispersed and thus the negative-binomial 
model is the appropriate choice. 
9 Introducing all control variables reduces the number of observations to 839 country years 
and 162 failures. Conflicts where no conflict termination occurs by 2007 are removed as they 
do not have the opportunity to “fail”. 
10 A summary of these variables is included in the appendix. 
11 Including a variable measuring the presence of PGMs and interacting this with a variable 
capturing the presence of co-ethnic PGMs is not possible as there are no cases in which co-
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ethnic PGMs are present without PGMs. The interaction term will always be dropped from 
the analysis due to collinearity. 
12 We also replicate all of our robustness checks using this specification, and the all results 
remain consistent. 
13 Kalyvas (2008) argues that defection to the government side is more common in later 
stages of rebellion.  
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